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IPO Underpricing, Post-Listing Liquidity, and Information Asymmetry in 
the Secondary Market 
Articles documenting the average underpricing of initial public offerings are legion.  They 
report average positive initial returns in all markets at all times (Ritter and Welch, 2002), with 
time-varying (Loughran and Ritter, 2002) and country-depending mean levels, as well as 
large cross-sectional variances (Gajewski and Gresse, 2006).  Those stylized facts have given 
rise to a large body of theoretical literature, which, in turn, has invited empiricists to test 
which theories best explained initial underpricing.  Oldest models such as Rock (1986) 
attribute initial underpricing to the information asymmetry between investors about the value 
of the candidate firm and interpret it as a cost to bear by issuers to attract uninformed 
investors in the primary market.  Ever since, other explanations have been proposed: price 
support, underwriters’ behaviour, analysts’ or investors’ over-optimism etc.  Recently, initial 
underpricing has been related to secondary market’s quality, and in particular liquidity, with 
divergent empirical findings between the US markets and the UK market. 
Several empirical studies are supportive of the notion that initial public offering underpricing 
boosts the subsequent secondary market liquidity of the stock.  Miller and Reilly (1987), 
Hanley (1993), Schultz and Zaman (1994), Reese (1998), Hahn and Ligon (2004), and Zheng 
and Li (2008) documented that underpriced IPOs, on average, exhibit higher after-market 
trading activity than overpriced IPOs.  Pham, Kalev, and Steen (2003) and Li, Zheng, and 
Melancon (2005) evidence that a higher level of underpricing lead to not only increased 
trading turnover but also lower bid-ask spreads.  Consistent with the theory of Booth and 
Chua (1996), Pham et al. (2003) find that this relationship is formed through the mediation of 
ownership structure resulting from the allocation process.  Alternatively, Reese (1998) assigns 
the positive relationship between underpricing and post-listing liquidity to financial media 
coverage which reduces information asymmetry, a thesis corroborated by the results of Li, 
McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) for a sample of NASDAQ IPOs between 1995 and 2000.  In 
contrast, Ellul and Pagano (2006) demonstrate that initial underpricing can be an increasing 
function of the expected post-listing illiquidity due to asymmetric information because IPO 
underpricing compensates uninformed investors who participate in the issue for the expected 
trading adverse selection costs that they will bear in the after-market.  In addition, they 
provide empirical evidence in support of their theory using a sample of UK IPOs.  
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Our research aims at departing between the Booth and Chua’s and the Ellul and Pagano’s 
theories.  More precisely, it addresses the following questions.  Does initial underpricing 
boost post-IPO liquidity, or conversely, is it a compensation for after-market illiquidity and 
asymmetric information? If underpricing enhances after-market liquidity, does it result from 
the broader ownership obtained by underpricing the issue? 
Our answers to these questions are based on a sample of IPOs undertaken at Euronext Paris 
between 1995 and 2004, and they contribute to the existing literature in several ways.  First, 
many of the empirical studies that find a positive link between IPO underpricing and post-
listing liquidity are based on daily trading volumes only.  We rather adopt a microstructure 
approach, like Pham et al. (2003) and Ellul and Pagano (2006), and use other measures of 
liquidity.  Trading volumes are complemented with other liquidity measures based on daily 
data, and for continuously-traded securities, we also use spreads and information asymmetry 
metrics.  Second, converse to US samples which are only composed of book-built IPOs, our 
sample is diversified in terms of IPO mechanisms and includes not only pure book-buildings, 
but also mixed book-buildings, auctions, and fixed-price offers.  This is also a difference with 
the study of Pham et al. (2003), whose sample is mainly compounded of fixed-price offers.  
The diversity of our sample in terms of issuing procedures ensures that our findings are not 
driven by the specifics of a given issue mechanism and allows us to compare book-built IPOs 
to others.  Third, most US studies are based on Nasdaq IPOs for which the secondary market 
has a dealership structure.  This is also the case of the Ellul and Pagano’s sample in the UK.  
Their results may therefore be due to the market making role that underwriters can play in this 
type of market after the listing.  Last but not least, our findings contrasts with those of Pham 
et al. (2003) in that we rule out the ownership dispersion story, and they completely oppose to 
those of Ellul and Pagano (2006) with respect to information asymmetry.  This suggest that 
some other theory should be sought to explain the positive relation between underpricing and 
liquidity. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: Section 1 is dedicated to the testable 
hypotheses and the institutional settings; Section 2 describes the sample, the data, and the 
variables used in the study; Sections 3 and 4 present the methodology and the results 
respectively; Section 5 concludes.  
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1. Testable hypotheses and institutional settings 
On the way underpricing relates to after-market liquidity, two theories oppose.  A theory first 
defended by Booth and Chua (1996) stipulates that underpricing is a means to ensure a diffuse 
ownership and therefore enhance post-IPO liquidity.  According to this hypothesis, which will 
be designated as the liquidity-promotion hypothesis, post-listing spreads should be negatively 
related to underpricing.  Conversely, a more recent theory developed by Ellul and Pagano 
(2006) posits that post-IPO spreads and asymmetric information measures increase with 
underpricing because underpricing is a compensation for illiquidity costs expected in the 
after-market.  This hypothesis will be referred to as the illiquidity-compensation hypothesis. 
1.1. The liquidity-promotion hypothesis 
On the one hand, an IPO candidate may desire a concentrated ownership at the expense of 
liquidity so as to confer greater monitoring power to pre-IPO or new large shareholders.  IPOs 
seeking a concentrated ownership will not underprice their shares at the issue, as large 
shareholders possess superior information about the company’s true value and do not bear 
information costs.  They could even be overpriced as large shareholders may be prepared to 
pay a premium for control. 
On the other hand, an issuer may wish a diffuse ownership structure in order to obtain higher 
secondary-market liquidity for its shares, a factor often considered as an important criterion of 
success of an IPO (Corwin, Harris, and Lipson, 2004).  Further, a more liquid secondary 
market can make corporate governance more effective (Maug, 1998).  In general, higher after-
market liquidity contributes to increase the firm’s value and reduce its cost of capital in 
several ways.  It improves the issuing firm’s future access to capital markets namely by 
attracting investors, reducing transaction costs in future equity raisings (Ibbotson and Ritter, 
1995), and lowering gross fees requested by investment banks in subsequent equity offerings 
(Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005).  It also reduces the illiquidity premium and thus the 
returns required by investors to hold the firm’s shares (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996).  Booth and Chua (1996) demonstrate that IPO firms 
seeking secondary-market liquidity will underprice their shares in order to attract a large 
number of small shareholders and create a more dispersed ownership structure.  Consistent 
with this theory, Michaely and Shaw (1994) and Brennan and Franks (1997) find higher 
underpricing for IPOs with more diverse shareholder base. 
We decompose the liquidity-promotion hypothesis into three testable hypotheses:  
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H1.  Ownership concentration decreases with initial underpricing. 
H2a. More underpriced IPOs are characterised by a higher post-listing liquidity: higher 
trading activity and tighter spreads. 
H3.  IPOs with a more diffuse ownership structure have a more liquid secondary market. 
1.2. The illiquidity-compensation hypothesis 
In contrast with the Booth and Chua’s theory, Ellul and Pagano (2006) demonstrate that initial 
underpricing is an increasing function of the expected post-listing illiquidity due to 
asymmetric information.  They propose a model in which investors worry about the after-
market illiquidity that may result from asymmetric information after the IPO.  The less liquid 
the after-market is expected to be, and the less predictable its liquidity, the larger the IPO 
underpricing, because IPO underpricing compensates uninformed investors who participates 
in the issue not only for adverse selection costs borne at the IPO stage but also for the 
expected trading costs that they will bear by liquidating their shares in the after-market.  In 
addition, Ellul and Pagano (2006) provide empirical evidence in support of their theory using 
a sample of 337 IPOs undertaken between 1998 and 2000 at the LSE, either on the Main 
Market or on AIM. 
The illiquidity-compensation theory leads us to posit the following two hypotheses, which are 
the alternative hypotheses of H2a and H4. 
H2b.  More underpriced IPOs are characterised by a lower post-listing liquidity: lower 
trading activity and larger spreads in the aftermarket. 
H4.  Information asymmetry in the secondary market increases with initial underpricing. 
1.3. Institutional settings 
The above-mentioned hypotheses are tested on a sample of IPOs undertaken on Euronext 
Paris between 1995 and 2004.  During that period, Euronext Paris was organised in three 
regulated market segments
1: the Premier Marché (i.e. Main Market) designed for the listing of 
large companies, the Second Marché (i.e. Parallel Market) that catered to middle and small 
                                                 
 
1 In 2005, Euronext Paris merged the Premier Marché and the Second Marché into a single segment, Eurolist, and the 
Nouveau Marché was closed and replaced by Alternext. For more institutional details, refer to Boutron et al. (2007)  
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capitalisations, and the Nouveau Marché (i.e. New Market) for growth companies
2.  IPOs 
generally take place in the Second Marché or the Nouveau Marché, and such is the case the 
firms of our sample. 
For any new listing, the specificity of Euronext Paris’ primary market is to offer and handle a 
panel of initial offering mechanisms
3 comprising a fixed-price offering procedure, a book-
building procedure denominated placement, and three auction mechanisms (direct admission, 
minimum price offer, and open-price offer) in which Euronext is the auctioneer.  Fixed-price 
offer and open-price offerings can be associated with a placement.  In fact, most book-built 
issues are offered as a double stage issue whereby, in addition to the private book-building 
process, a separate mechanism offers shares to the public.  The simplest and most common 
technique is to offer shares to the public at a fixed price which is equal to the equilibrium 
price set during the book-building process.  An alternative method is to organise an auction in 
which individual investors can place limit orders.  In this case, the issue price may differ for 
each category of subscribers.  The Euronext regulation requires that the issue price paid by 
institutions in the book-building process should not be lower than the definitive public offer 
price. 
Euronext’s secondary markets are order-driven but they have different features according to 
the market segment and the liquidity of the stock traded.  The Parallel Market worked very 
similarly to the present Eurolist market segment.  For most liquid stocks, order book trading 
was continuous,  and the trading session started and terminated with batch auctions.  For less 
liquid securities, trading was only periodic with one or two batch auctions a day.  The New 
Market had a structure comparable to that of Alternext today.  Two batch auctions were run 
per day.  Besides, market markets supplied liquidity on a continuous basis between auctions 
and actively participated in the auction procedures. 
2. Sample, data, and measures 
We investigate the way four categories of factors interact with each others: initial 
underpricing, owernship structure, post-listing liquidity, and information asymmetry.  We 
                                                 
 
2 For a detailed description of listing requirements on these segments, see Gajewski and Gresse (2006). 
3 For a detailed description of these listing mechanisms, see Gajewski and Gresse (2006).  
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thus need to cross three types of data: IPO data including IPO mechanism, ownership data, 
and stock market data.  We first describe how such data have been gathered for 204 IPOs in 
the 1995-2004 period.  Then, measures of underpricing, liquidity, ownership structure, and 
information asymmetry are presented. 
2.1. Sample and data 
This empirical study has been led by using data from four sources.  First, we gathered the 
prospectuses available in the AMF
4 database for IPOs undertaken on Euronext Paris during 
the period 1995-2004.  After excluding transfers and listing of foreign compagnies, we 
obtained a sample of 231 IPOs for which we retrieved in the prospectuses the IPO date, the 
subscription price, the number of shares on sale in the IPO, the number of shares outstanding 
after the IPO, the IPO allocation mechanism, and the percentage of shares held by the 
managers and members of their families before the IPO.  Second, we retrieved post-IPO 
closing prices from Datastream for the 231 IPOs and we extracted trade and quote data from 
Euronext CD-Roms.  The Euronext database covered 211 stocks of the initial sample.  Third, 
information on post-IPO shareholdings could be collected from DAFSA Liens for 204 of these 
IPOs.  In DAFSA Liens, ownership data are available on an annual frequency at the end of the 
year, so that the ownership structure available in DAFSA Liens immediately after the IPO is 
that observed on the 31
st of December following the primary listing.  Out of the 204 IPOs 
constituting the final sample, 112 were undertaken in the Second Marché and 92 took place in 
the Nouveau Marché.  Thanks to this even distribution of the sample between both market 
segments, our findings are not dependent of the peculiarities of growth markets’ structure.  In 
terms of IPO mechanisms, 155 issues involved a book-building process, 40 were auctioned, 
and 9 were fixed-priced.  Among the 155 book-built IPOs, 14 were exclusively book-built, 42 
were associated with an auctioned public offer, and 99 were followed by a fixed-priced 
offering.  All the auctioned and fixed-price IPOs of the sample were undertaken in the 
nineties while the IPOs conducted in or after 2000 all used a mixed mechanisms which 
associated the book-building process with either an auction or a fixed-price offer. 
                                                 
 
4 Autorité des Marchés Financiers.  
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2.2. Underpricing and liquidity measures 
For each stock of the sample, underpricing is measured as the return between the closing price 










U − =   (1),
where  5 P  is the closing price on the fifth business day following the IPO,  0 P  is the IPO price, 
5 I  is the closing value of the SBF250 index on the fifth day following the IPO, and  5 I  is the 
closing value of the index on the day of the IPO.  The IPO is underpriced (overpriced) when 
0 U >  ( 0 U < ). 
As we test the relation between ownership structure and liquidity, we need to measure 
liquidity over a post-IPO period which is as close as possible to the date at which the post-
listing ownership structure is observed.  We choose to estimate liquidity measures on an 
observation period that surrounds the date at which we observe the post-listing ownership, 
that is over 6 months starting on the 1
st of October following the IPO.  For IPOs occurred five 
trading days prior to October 1 or later, we make the 6-month period start five trading days 
after the IPO date.  This 5-day gap is meant to eliminate the effect of the abnormal trading 
activity generally observed in the first days following primary listings.  Among the 204 IPOs 
of our sample, 87 were traded continuously within the 6-month observation period.  The 
remaining 117 stocks were traded in batch auctions only (one or two per day). 
For the whole sample, post-IPO liquidity is measured with the average daily turnover, the 
Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity ratio, and the zero-return ratio of Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka 
(1999).  The average daily turnover, denoted TURN, is the average daily volume in 
percentage of the number of shares sold in the IPO.  The Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity ratio is 















where Rt is the stock return measured in logarithm on closing prices at date t, Vt is the trading 
volume on date t, and T is the number of trading days in the observation period.  The 
Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999)’s measure (L_O_T) is the ratio of zero-return days to 
the total number of trading days in the observation period.  The intuition behind this measure  
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is that no informed trading occurs when trading costs are high enough to offset trading gains, 
which leads to zero daily returns. 















































where  k bid ,  k ask ,  k mid  and  k d  are respectively the best bid quote, the best ask quote, the 
mid quote, and the duration of the best quotes observed at the time of the k
th quoted spread in 
the observation period; K is the total number of quoted spreads observed for the stock in the 
observation period; Pn is the transaction price for the n
th transaction in the observation period; 
midn is the mid-quote prevailing at the time of the n
th trade; and N is the total number of trades 
in the period. 
2.3. Measures of information asymmetry 
Measures of information asymmetry are derived over the same 6-month observation period as 
that chosen to measure liquidity.  The magnitude of information asymmetry is estimated with 
three methodologies: the average 30-minute price impact denoted PIMP, the alpha coefficient 
of Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) denoted αlsb, and the PIN measure denoted PIN. 
We conduct the decomposition of the effective spread in a realized spread and a price impact 
within a 30-mn interval in the manner of Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997)’s approach.  















where  min 30 + n mid  is the mid price quoted 30 minutes after the n
th transaction of the period. 
Then, the Lin, Sanger, and Booth’s adverse selection component  lsb α  is estimated for each 
stock as the sensitivity of mid price revisions to trade sizes with the following regression 
model for each stock: 
( ) 1 1 + + + − = − n n n n lsb n n e Q mid P mid mid α   (6), 
  9
where  n Q  is the sign of the n
th trade and  1 + n mid  is the mid quote prevailing immediately 
after that trade.  All regressions are GMM. 
Finally, we compute the PIN measure of Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996), which 
is based on trade direction.  The probability of observing B buys and S sells on a given day 
can be implemented as follows: 
() () () () ( ) ( )
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where α is the probability of an information event which is bad news with probability δ and 
good news with probability 1-δ.  The arrival rate of informed trades is μ.  ε is the rate of 
uninformed buy and sell trade arrivals.  Over an observation period of T days, the likelihood 
of observing ()
T
t t t S B 1 , =  buys and sells corresponds to the product of the daily likelihoods: 
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In order to estimate the (α, δ, μ, ε) parameters, we maximise the likelihood defined in 




= PIN   (9).
 
2.4. Measures of ownership structure 
Several variables of ownership structure have been extracted from DAFSA Liens to measure 
ownership concentration after the IPO at the date of the 31
st of December just after the IPO.  
We extracted the percentage of shares held by the managers (MAN), members of their families 
(FAM), and institutional investors (INST).  In order to estimate the ownership concentration, 
we identified all the blockholders who possess at least 5 percent of the firm shares and 
computed their total holding in percentage (BLOCK).  We also calculated the Herfindhal 








i s HERF   (10),
where  i s  is the part that belongs to the i
th largest shareholder (i=1,…,5).  
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3. Test design 
The relations between initial underpricing, ownership concentration, and secondary market’s 
liquidity are analysed running a three-stage multivariate analysis that combines logistic and 
OLS regressions in the Heckman style to avoid endogeneity biases.  The same methodology is 
used to test the links between initial underpricing, ownership concentration, and information 
asymmetry.  All tests are conducted on the whole sample first.  Then, they are repeated on the 
sub-sample of firms that went public by using a book-building procedure.  This comparison 
will allow us to determine whether the discretion provided by the book-building mechanism 
in the share allocation process may result in a more effective effect of IPO underpricing on 
ownership structure and post-listing liquidity.  In order to avoid biases due to outliers, the 
statistics testing the significance of the coefficients are bootstrapped in all regressions. 
3.1. First-stage logistic regression: estimation of the probability of underpricing 
In a first stage, the probability for an issue to be underpriced, denoted  () 0 U P > , is modelled 
as a function of the pre-IPO managers’ holdings and the after-market risk
5.  The proxy we use 
for the risk perceived at the time of the IPO is the daily closing return volatility in the post-
listing observation period, denoted σ : 
() 1 2 0 1 0
~ 0 ε σ + + + = > a MAN a a U P   (11).
3.2. Second-stage OLS regressions 
In a second stage, we investigate how underpricing influences post-listing ownership structure 
and secondary market’ liquidity.  In both cases, initial underpricing is the independent 
variable and is measured using the probability of an issue to be underpriced as estimated in 
the first-stage Logit analysis. 
3.2.1. Post-listing liquidity and initial underpricing 
For the whole sample, the average daily turnover (TURN), the Amihud illiquidity ratio 
(AMIH), and the zero-return ratio (L_O_T) are regressed on the level of underpricing 
                                                 
 
5 Others factors comprising earnings per share, the P/E ratio, the book-to-market ratio, the age of the firm, the debt leverage, 
the return on assets, the IPO size measured as the number of shares on sale in the IPO multiplied by the subscription price, 
the post-listing market value, and the price level, have been inserted in the model, but none of them has been proved to 
influence the probability of underpricing.  
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predicted in the first-stage model, after controlling for volatility, market value, and price 
level: 
2 4 3 2 1 0
~ ) 0 ( ˆ ln ln _ _ , , ε σ + × > + + + + = U U P b P b MV b b b T O L or AMIH TURN   (12),
where lnMV is the logarithm of the firm’s market value at the IPO date, P is the average 
closing price during the liquidity observation period,  ) 0 ( ˆ > U P  is the probability of the IPO to 
be underpriced as predicted from model (11), and U is the underpricing calculated as in 
equation (1).  In case of overpricing (U<0), the variable  U U P × > ) 0 ( ˆ  is set to 0. 
For the sub-sample of IPO stocks that were continuously traded during the observation period, 
we also test how initial underpricing relates to quoted (QS) and effective (ES) spreads.   
Control variables used are volatility, trading volumes, and price level: 
3 4 3 2 1 0
~ ) 0 ( ˆ ln ln ε σ + × > + + + + = U U P c P c V c c c ES or QS   (13),
where lnV is the logarithm of the average daily trading volume over the six-months period. 
3.2.2. Ownership structure and initial underpricing 
In parallel, we test whether underpricing impacts ownership structure and model the measures 
of ownership structure (HERF, BLOCK, and INST) as a function of the underpricing level 
predicted at the first stage in the Heckman style.  Because large firms are likely to have more 
diffuse ownership and because family-owned companies usually have concentrated 
shareholding structures, we control for market size and family holdings, so that regressions 
are designed in the following way: 
4 3 2 1 0
~ ) 0 ( ˆ , , ε + × > + + + = U U P d FAM d SIZE d d INST or BLOCK HERF   (14),
where SIZE is the logarithm of the issue size calculated as the number of shares on sale in the 
IPO multiplied by the subscription price, and FAM is the percentage of shares retained by the 
manager’s family after the IPO. 
3.3. Third-stage OLS regressions: liquidity and ownership structure 
In the third stage, liquidity measures are regressed on ownership concentration measures and 
institutional holdings as predicted in the second-stage regressions (14).  The same control 
variables as in models (12) and (13) are used: 
( ) 5 4 3 2 1 0
~ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ln ln _ _ , , ε σ + + + + + = NST I or LOCK B ERF H e P e MV e e e T O L or AMIH TURN (15),
( ) 6 4 3 2 1 0
~ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ln ln ε σ + + + + + = NST I or LOCK B ERF H f P f V f f f ES or QS   (16), 
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where  ERF H ˆ ,  LOCK B ˆ , and  NST I ˆ  are the predicted values of HERF, BLOCK, and INST 
from models (14). 
3.4. Information asymmetry, initial underpricing, and ownership structure 
For continuously traded stocks, the relationship between information asymmetry, initial 
underpricing, and ownership concentration are tested with the same three-stage approach, the 
first stage being the estimation of the probability of underpricing,  ( ) 0 U P > , as in equation 
(11). 
At the second-stage level, measures of information asymmetry (αlsb, PIMP, and PIN) are 
regressed on predicted underpricing after controlling for market size, price level, insider 
shareholding, the market segment (Parallel or New market), the industrial sector (new 
technologies vs traditional industries and services): 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
~ ) 0 ( ˆ ln ln ε + × > + + + + + + = U U P g NTIC g NM g MAN g P g MV g g IA   (17),
with IA being alternatively  lsb α ,  PIMP, or PIN .  NM is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
firm is listed in the New Market, 0 otherwise, and NTIC is a binary variable set to 1 for new-
technologies firms. 
At the third-stage level, measures of information asymmetry  are regressed on the ownership 
variables as predicted in models (14), and the same control variables as in equation (17) are 
used: 
8 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
~ ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ( ln ln ε + + + + + + + = NST I or LOCK B ERF H i NTIC i NM i MAN i P i MV i i IA (18).
4. Results 
Table 1 reports general statistics on initial underpricing, liquidity, risk, and ownership 
structure for the whole sample of IPO firms and the sample restricted to the book-built firms.  
Initial underpricing reaches an average level of 21.22% for the whole sample and 20.61% for 
the restricted sample.  Statistics on ownership show that most firms are closely held by 
blockholders after the IPO.  On average, more than 73% of shares are retained by 
shareholders who own more than 5% of shares after the IPO, and almost 56% of the shares 
are retained by the managers after the IPO.  Furthermore, institutional holdings are substantial 
with an average share that nearly reaches 10%.  Average liquidity levels are those typically 
observed for middle capitalisation stocks.  No striking difference appears for book-built IPOs, 
with the exception that book-built IPO stocks are riskier.  
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Table 1 about here 
Table 2 presents a matrix of correlations between IPO underpricing, measures of liquidity, 
ownership variables, and information-asymmetry measures.  Three remarks can be drawn 
from this matrix: (1) post-listing liquidity is significantly and positively correlated to IPO 
underpricing whatever measure is considered; (2) two liquidity measures, the turnover and the 
zero-return ratio, are significantly correlated with ownership concentration, showing that 
higher shareholding concentration is associated with lower liquidity; (3) initial underpricing is 
negatively associated with all measures of information asymmetry. 
Table 2 about here 
The relations between initial underpricing, ownership dispersion, and liquidity are then 
investigated through the multivariate analysis described at Section 3.  Table 3 displays the 
results on the 2
nd-stage relation between initial underpricing and after-market liquidity in two 
panels.  The estimations conducted over the global sample show that post-listing liquidity 
increases with initial underpricing.  According to the bootstrapped t-statistics, the statistical 
significance of the underpricing variable coefficents reaches 5% for the regressions of the 
zero-return ratio, the Amihud ratio, and quoted spreads, and 10% for those of turnover and 
effective spreads.  When restricting the sample to book-built IPOs, the findings hold, but the 
levels of statistical significance change for some liquidity variables.  The significance level 
falls to 10% for the regression of the Amihud ratio and the relation with effective spreads is 
no longer significant, while in contrast, the relation with turnover and the zero-return ratio has 
a stronger economic and statistical significance.  Those findings allow us to reject (validate) 
H2b (H2a) and to conclude that underpricing promotes post-listing liquidity. 
Table 3 about here 
Results on the relation between shareholding structure and after-market liquidity are 
displayed in Table 4.  Panel A shows the estimates for the whole sample while Panel B is 
dedicated to the sub-sample of book-buildings.  The results in Table 4 indicate that the 
liquidity effect we have evidenced is not formed through the mediation of ownership 
structure, converse to the findings of Pham et al. (2003) over an Australian sample.  The first 
three lines of Table 4 Panel A, which report the estimations for the second-stage regressions 
of ownership variables on underpricing, show that ownership dispersion and institutional 
holdings are unrelated to initial underpricing, and this result is unchanged when the sample is 
reduced to book-built issues (Panel B).  Therefore, as Hill (2006) for the UK, we reject  
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hypothesis H1
6.  The remainder of Table 4 displays the results for the third-stage regressions.  
Again, they indicate that ownership concentration as predicted by the second-stage 
regressions do not impact the liquidity in the secondary market.  This leads us to reject H3.  
Results for the book-buildings’ sub-sample, reported in Panel B of Table 4, are similar.  One 
result appears though, for the book-buildings specifically: we find a positive link between 
institutional holdings and spreads which is significant at the 10% threshold. 
Table 4 about here 
The estimations for the regressions involving asymmetric information measures are displayed 
in Tables 5 and 6.  As shown in Table 5, the three measures of information asymmetry 
negatively relate to initial underpricing with a statistical significance of 5%, for either the 
whole sample or the book-building sub-population, so that we reject H4.  Once again, the 
relation is not obtained through the mediation of ownership structure, as none of our measures 
of information asymmetry is significantly influenced by either ownership concentration or 
institutional holdings (cf. Table 6). 
Tables 5 and 6 about here 
                                                 
 
6 Because no significant relation is found between ownership concentration and underpricing, we cannot support the opposite 
theory of Stoughton and Zechner (1998), who suggest that IPO firms underprice their stocks at issuance to create a more 
concentrated ownership structure.  
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5. Conclusion 
Over a sample of Euronext IPOs between 1995 and 2004, we validate the liquidity-promotion 
theory according to which initial underpricing boosts post-listing liquidity,  but reject the 
illiquidity-compensation hypothesis which views underpricing as a compensation for 
illiquidity costs in the secondary market.  More underpriced IPO stocks are more intensively 
traded in the post-listing period, this effect being stronger for book-built IPOs, and spreads are 
also negatively correlated to initial underpricing.  Further, adverse selection costs and 
informed trading are lower for more underpriced IPO stocks, which suggests that more public 
information is produced for these stocks.  In contradiction with the Booth and Chua’s theory, 
we fail to prove that these effects result from a more diffuse ownership obtained by 
underpricing the issue.  We rather assign them to investors and media’s interest in IPOs that 
perform well in the immediate after-market, as argued in the model of Aggarwal, Krigman, 
and Womack (2002).  Besides, we find that spreads of book-built IPOs enlarges with 
institutional stockholdings.  At this point, the empirical evidence we hold on this matter has a 
weak significance, but the topic could be better investigated in future research.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on sample firms 
  All IPOs  Book-built IPOs only 
Variable  # Obs  Mean  Standard-deviation  # Obs  Mean  Standard-deviation 
AGE  204 12.74  12.16  155 11.61  11.31 
P0  204 21.73  10.74  155 20.46  10.46 
SIZE  204 16,582,762  19,297,239  155 20,050,633  20,889,094 
U  204 21.22%  37.39%  155 20.61%  38.79% 
V  204 425,590  787,065  155 462,343  860,299 
TURN   204 0.1412%  0.1646%  155 0.1508%  0.1474% 
σ   204 3.9176%  1.8763%  155 4.2473%  1.9385% 
QS   87 2.4508%  1.1802%  77 2.5700%  1.1993% 
ES   87 2.2168%  0.9695%  77 2.3177%  0.7346% 
BLOCK  204 0.7281  0.1557  155 0.6994  0.1521 
INST  204 0.1023  0.1652  155 0.1190  0.1728 
MAN  204 0.5454  0.2937  155 0.4965  0.2771 
HERF  204 0.3329  0.2160  155 0.2930  0.1956 
Note: AGE is the age of the firm at the time of the IPO.  P0 is the IPO price.  SIZE corresponds to the issue size equal to the number of shares on sale times the IPO 
price.  For each stock of the sample, IPO underpricing is measured as the adjusted return (U) observed over the first five trading days.  All trading measures are 
estimated over the six months surrounding the 31
st of December that follows the IPO date.  V is the average trading volume in € over this post-listing period.  TURN 
is the average daily turnover, that is the average daily volume in percentage of the number of shares sold in the IPO.  σ  is the closing return volatility.  We compute 
duration-weighted average quoted and effective spreads (QS and  ES).  BLOCK is the percentage of shares controlled by the blockholders.  INST is the percentage of 
shares controlled by institutional investors.  MAN  is the percentage of shares retained by the managers.  HERF is the Herfindhal index of ownership concentration.  
All ownership variables are measured after the IPO (at the end of the year following the IPO).  
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Table 2. Matrix of correlations between IPO underpricing, liquidity and information asymmetry 
  Underpricing Measures  of  liquidity  Ownership structure variables  Information asymmetry measures 






































































































































































































































Note: For each stock of the sample, IPO underpricing is measured as the adjusted return (U) observed over the first five trading days for underpriced issues and is set to 0 for others.  Liquidity and 
information asymmetry measures are estimated over a six-month period surrounding the 31
st of December that follows the IPO date.  The average daily turnover (TURN), that is the average daily volume 
in percentage of the number of shares sold in the IPO, the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trczinka’s zero-return ratio (L_O_T), and the Amihud illiquidity ratio (AMIH) are calculated for every stock.  Duration-
weighted average quoted spreads (QS) and average effective spreads (ES) are computed for continuously traded stocks.  HERF is the Herfindhal index of ownership concentration.  BLOCK is the 
percentage of shares controlled by the blockholders.  INST is the percentage of shares controlled by institutional investors.  All ownership measures are measured after the IPO (at the end of the year 
following the IPO).   lsb α , PIN, and PIMP denote the Lin, Sanger, and Booth’s alpha coefficient, the average 30-minute price impact, and the PIN measure respectively.  They are estimated for 
continuously traded stocks only.  ***,**,* indicate that the coefficient is significantly positive or negative respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.  P-values are reported in brackets.  
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Table 3. IPO underpricing and after-market liquidity 
  ( ) 0 U P >     All IPOs  Book-built IPOs only 
     TURN   L_O_T  AMIH  QS   ES   TURN   L_O_T  AMIH  QS   ES  
Number of 
observations  204   204  204  204  87  87    155  155  155  77  77 
Regression type  Probit    OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS    OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
intercept  0.7404**   0.2306  83.7179***  11.8675*** 9.6144***  8.5561***    0.1725  86.1932***  10.9182**  9.8968***  8.7604*** 
  (0.014)    (0.346) (<.0001)  (0.001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)    (0.274)  (<.0001) (0.016) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
MAN0  0.6841**                        
  (0.029)                        
σ   -0.1309**    0.0387*** -2.3331***  0.1094  0.1148*** 0.1011***   0.0418***  -2.1836***  0.1052  0.1232*** 0.1080*** 
  (0.016)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.167)  (0.001)  (<.0001)    (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.239)  (0.006)  (0.001) 
lnMV     -0.0252*  -2.9620***  -0.5390***       -0.0216**  -3.1987*** -0.4928**     
     (0.070)  (<.0001)  (0.005)        (0.017) (<.0001)  (0.030)     
lnV           -0.5932***  -0.5430***          -0.6256***  -0.5662*** 
           (<.0001)  (<.0001)          (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
lnP      0.0604***  -1.8764***  -0.5750***  -0.0363 0.0318   0.0543***  -1.5205***  -0.5454***  -0.0107  0.0472 
     (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.802) (0.757)    (<.0001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.942) (0.673) 
() U 0 U P ˆ × >    8.4.10
-4* -0.0431**  -0.0106**  -0.0047** -0.0030*   0.0011** -0.0579***  -0.0099* -0.0046**  -0.0027 
     (0.072) (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.024) (0.081)    (0.038)  (0.003) (0.058) (0.041)  (0.15) 
Cox-Snell R²  8.70%                         
Adjusted R²      37.11%  37.02%  10.58%  63.45%  67.52%    59.55% 40.40% 8.45% 61.16% 65.08% 
Note: The second column of the table reports the results of the first stage Logit regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the issue is underpriced, 0 otherwise.  The probability of an 
issue to be underpriced is modelled as a function of the pre-IPO managers’ shareholdings (MAN0)and the risk of the stock proxied byσ, the closing return volatility over the six-month post-listing observation 
period.  The rest of the table reports the results of the 2-stage least square regressions of liquidity measures onto the initial underpricing predicted in the Heckman style, i.e. calculated as  () 0 ˆ > U P,   the predicted 
probability of being underpriced, multiplied by U, the actual level of underpricing.   ( ) 0 ˆ > U P ×U is set to 0 for overpriced issues.  Liquidity variables are measured on a six-month observation period 
surrounding the 31
st of December that follows the IPO date.  The average daily turnover (TURN), i.e. the average daily volume in percentage of the number of shares sold in the IPO, the Lesmond, Ogden, and 
Trczinka’s zero-return ratio (L_O_T), and the Amihud illiquidity ratio (AMIH) are calculated for all stocks.  The duration-weighted average quoted (QS) and the average effective spread (ES) are computed  for 
continuously traded stocks.  lnP is the average closing price in logarithm over the six-month observation period.  lnMV is the market value in logarithm.  lnV represents the logarithm of the average daily trading 
volume in euros.  P0 is the IPO price.  Bootstrapped P-values are in parentheses.  
*, 
**, 
*** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 4. Ownership structure and after-market liquidity 
Panel A – All sample 
  Intercept SIZE  FAM  ( ) U U P × > 0 ˆ   σ   lnMV lnV lnP   ERF H ˆ   LOCK B ˆ   NST I ˆ   # obs.  Adj. R² 
HERF  1.3370*** -0.0658***  0.2565***  -0.0007               204 27.96% 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.182)                 
BLOCK  1.2372*** -0.0347***  0.1778***  0.0002               204 22.56% 
  (<.0001) (0.001)  (<.0001)  (0.616)                 
INST  -0.6577*** 0.0492*** -0.1188***  -0.0002               204 15.22% 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  0.0001  (0.635)                 
TURN  0.5272       0.0360*** -0.0376*    0.0646*** -0.1998     204 37.29% 
  (0.188)       (<.0001) (0.055)    (<.0001)  (0.161)       
TURN  0.4875       0.0376*** -0.0322*    0.0662***    -0.1837    204 36.40% 
  (0.272)       (<.0001) (0.068)    (<.0001)    (0.335)      
TURN  0.5381       0.0357*** -0.0446*    0.0661***     0.4200 204  37.60% 
  (0.196)       (<.0001) (0.070)    (<.0001)     (0.184)    
L_O_T  72.7876***      -2.2511*** -2.4935***    -2.1201***  7.1552     204 36.56% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001) (<.0001)    (<.0001) (0.163)       
L_O_T  75.2375***      -2.3156*** -2.7100***    -2.1801***    5.7811    204 36.16% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001) (<.0001)    (<.0001)    (0.451)      
L_O_T  73.3779***      -2.2537*** -2.3033***    -2.1753***     -13.6070 204 36.55% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001) (0.005)    (<.0001)     (0.171)    
AMIH  10.6904**       0.1102 -0.4823**    -0.6458***  0.6682     204 9.65% 
  (0.012)       (0.141) (0.016)    (<.0001)  (0.709)       
AMIH  11.5048**       0.0992 -0.5157***    -0.6524***    0.0857    204 9.57% 
  (0.016)       (0.166) (0.008)    (<.0001)    (0.972)      
AMIH  11.1384***      0.1047 -0.4887**    -0.6517***     -0.6968 204 9.59% 
  (0.009)       (0.150) (0.034)    (<.0001)     (0.838)    
QS  10.1442***      0.1007***   -0.6208***  -0.0457  -0.6148    87 62.75% 
  (<.0001)       (0.004)   (<.0001)  (0.742)  (0.410)       
QS  10.7256***      0.1002**   -0.6179***  -0.0451   -1.1263    87 62.91% 
  (<.0001)       (0.005)   (<.0001)  (0.744)    (0.317)      
QS  9.8510***       0.0988**   -0.6367***  -0.0207    1.7659 87  63.25%  
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  (<.0001)       (0.005)   (<.0001)  (0.883)     (0.227)    
ES  8.9663***       0.0906***   -0.5637***  0.0288  -0.5231    87 67.26% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.768)  (0.384)       
ES  9.3941***       0.0907***   -0.5603***  0.0284    -0.8776    87 67.36% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.779)   (0.302)      
ES  8.7136***       0.0895***   -0.5755***  0.0480     1.4030 87  67.70% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.638)    (0.167)    
Panel B – Book-built IPOs only 
  Intercept SIZE  FAM  ( ) U U P × > 0 ˆ   σ   lnMV lnV  lnP   ERF H ˆ   LOCK B ˆ   NST I ˆ   # obs.  Adj. R² 
HERF  0.9832*** -0.0444***  0.2455***  -0.0009**               155 18.66% 
  (<.0001) (0.002)  (<.0001)  (0.034)                 
BLOCK  0.9992*** -0.0204  0.1736***  -0.0001               155 12.62% 
  (<.0001) (0.145)  (<.0001)  (0.762)                 
INST  -0.7353*** 0.0540*** -0.1478***  -0.0001               155 12.49% 
  (0.003) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.900)                 
TURN  0.2450       0.0430*** -0.0251**    0.0606*** -0.0620     155 56.80% 
  (0.190)       (<.0001) (0.011)    (<.0001)  (0.449)       
TURN  0.1340       0.0438*** -0.0215**    0.0614***    0.0317    155 56.68% 
  (0.505)       (<.0001) (0.017)    (<.0001)    (0.796)      
TURN  0.1944       0.0434*** -0.0238**    0.0611***     0.0416 155  56.68% 
  (0.302)       (<.0001) (0.031)    (<.0001)     (0.810)    
L_O_T  73.7238***      -2.1756*** -2.6865***    -1.7577***  10.4781     155 39.41% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001) (<.0001)    (0.001) (0.112)       
L_O_T  76.2087***      -2.2317*** -2.9664***    -1.8472***    8.7445    155 38.73% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001) (<.0001)    (<.0001)    (0.350)      
L_O_T  76.5367***      -2.2003*** -2.5318***    -1.8302***     -17.0455 155 39.08% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001) (0.002)    (0.001)     (0.191)    
AMIH  12.4253***      0.0771 -0.5446*    -0.6211***  -1.2431     155 7.79% 
  (0.0038)       (0.350) (0.055)    (0.007)  (0.370)       
AMIH  14.1441**       0.0748 -0.5515**    -0.6170***    -2.7841    155 8.08% 
  (0.029)       (0.348) (0.040)    (0.004)    (0.172)      
AMIH  12.8752**       0.0739 -0.6140*    -0.6165***     3.3916 155  7.98%  
  24 
  (0.036)       (0.361) (0.063)    (0.006)     (0.262)    
QS  10.9008***      0.1137***   -0.6865  0.002  -1.1933    77 61.05% 
  (<.0001)       (0.008)   (<.0001)  (0.989)  (0.240)       
QS  11.8614***      0.1152***   -0.6798***  0.0009    -1.9713    77 61.29% 
  (<.0001)       (0.004)   (<.0001)  (0.995)    (0.186)      
QS  10.4467***      0.1210***   -0.7307***  0.0535     3.2771* 77  62.09% 
  (<.0001)       (0.003)   (<.0001)  (0.729)     (0.083)    
ES  9.6005***       0.1023***   -0.6171***  0.0643  -1.0463    77 65.55% 
  (<.0001)       (0.001)   (<.0001)  (0.563)  (0.176)       
ES  10.3243***      0.1035***   -0.6084***  0.0612    -1.6005    77 65.64% 
  (<.0001)       (0.001)   (<.0001)  (0.559)    (0.160)      
ES  9.1795***       0.1084***   -0.6506***  0.1047     2.6909* 77  66.47% 
  (<.0001)       (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.360)    (0.057)    
Note: The first three lines of each panel report the estimations for the second-stage lest square regressions of ownership variables on underpricing.  The remainder of each panel displays the results of the third-stage 
regressions of liquidity measures onto ownership variables.  HERF is the Herfindhal index of ownership concentration.  BLOCK is the percentage of shares controlled by the blockholders.  INST is the percentage of 
shares controlled by institutional investors.  All ownership measures are measured after the IPO (at the end of the year following the IPO).  Liquidity measures are computed over a six-month period surrounding the 
end of the IPO year.  Liquidity is measured by the average daily turnover (TURN), the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trczinka’s zero-return ratio (L_O_T),  and the Amihud illiquidity ratio (AMIH) for all stocks.  Duration-
weighted average quoted spreads (QS) and average effective spreads (ES) are calculated for continuously traded stocks.   ERF H ˆ ,  LOCK B ˆ , and  NST I ˆ  are the respective value of HERF, BLOCK, and INST as 
predicted by the second-stage models.  σ and P are respectively the closing return volatility and the average closing price over the six-month observation period.  lnMV is the market value in logarithm.  lnV represents 
the logarithm of the average daily trading volume in euros.  Bootstrapped P-values are in parentheses.  
*, 
**, 
*** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5. After-market information asymmetry and underpricing 
  All IPOs  Book-built IPOS only 
  lsb α   PIMP PIN  lsb α   PIMP PIN 
2.6031*** 1.6940***  0.7681*  3.0267***  2.0582***  0.3883  intercept  (<.0001) (0.004)  (0.068)  (<.0001)  (0.005)  (0.150) 
-0.0936*** -0.0440  -0.0257  -0.1159*** -0.0617  -0.0056  lnMV  (0.003) (0.142) (0.257)  (0.001)  (0.101)  (0.705) 
-0.1339*** -0.1206***  0.0027  -0.1340***  -0.1281***  0.0033  lnP   (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.789)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.733) 
-0.0718 -0.0647 0.0685*  -0.0569  -0.0726  0.0658  MAN  (0.274) (0.385) (0.084)  (0.419)  (0.384)  (0.151) 
0.0456 0.0101 0.0116  0.0221  0.0065  0.0052  NM  (0.290) (0.870) (0.502)  (0.618)  (0.917)  (0.775) 
0.0917** 0.1787*** -0.0423**  0.0952**  0.1590**  -0.0263  NTIC  (0.047) (0.005) (0.041)  (0.048)  (0.010)  (0.179) 
-0.0018*** -0.0020** -0.0012***  -0.0016** -0.0015**  -0.0012***  () U 0 U P ˆ × >   (0.005) (0.013) (0.002)  (0.014) (0.025) (0.003) 
Number of 
observations  87 87 87  77  77  77 
Adjusted R²  44.34% 36.83% 10.47%  44.21%  37.01%  7.66% 
Note: This table displays the estimations for the second-stage regressions of information asymmetry measures on initial underpricing.  
Dependant variables are the alpha coefficient of Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995), the average 30-minute price impact, and the PIN measure, 
denoted αlsb, PIMP, and PIN respectively.  The dependent variable  ( ) U U P × > 0 ˆ  is the probability for an issue to be underpriced as predicted 
in the first-stage logit regression multiplied by the actual level of underpricing.  It is set to 0 for overpriced IPOs.  Control variables comprise 
the market value in logarithm (lnMV), the average post-listing closing price in logarithm (lnP), the managers’ holdings after the IPO (MAN), a 
binary variable equal to 1 for New Market issues (NM), a binary variable equal to 1 for new technologies firms (NTIC).  ***,**,* indicate that 
the coefficient is significantly positive or negative respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels.  Bootstrapped P-values are reported in brackets.  
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Table 6. After-market information asymmetry and ownership structure 
    All IPOs    Book-built IPOs only 
    lsb α   PIMP PIN   
lsb α   PIMP PIN 
Number  of  observations  87  87  87  77  77  77 
ERF H ˆ   coefficient -0.0735  -0.0103  -0.1127    -0.1238  -0.133  0.1768 
  P-value  (0.801)  (0.974) (0.616)    (0.696) (0.710) (0.423) 
  Adj. R²  41.22%  33.27%  4.01%    41.59%  35.06%  0.03% 
LOCK B ˆ   coefficient -0.3927  -0.3268  -0.3049    -0.4970  -0.4861  0.0630 
  P-value  (0.343)  (0.497) (0.320)    (0.287) (0.351) (0.839) 
  Adj. R²  41.90%  33.71%  5.59%    42.42%  35.76%  -1.39% 
NST I ˆ   coefficient 0.3289  0.2745  0.4691    0.5039  0.4911  -0.0705 
  P-value  (0.535)  (0.645) (0.260)    (0.420) (0.498) (0.865) 
  Adj. R²  41.49%  33.47%  6.74%    42.05%  35.43%  -1.42% 
Note: This table reports the results of third-stage regressions, in which measures of information asymmetry (αlsb, PIMP, and 
PIN) are regressed on the predicted values of the ownership variables  ERF H ˆ ,  LOCK B ˆ , and  NST I ˆ  alternatively.  For each 
regression, the table provides the coefficient of the ownership variable used, the P-value associated, and the adjusted R² of 
the regression.  Control variables included in the regressions comprise market value, price level, insiders’ holdings, market 
segment (traditional or new market), and industrial sector (new technologies vs traditional industries and services).  ***,**,* 
indicate that the coefficient is significantly positive or negative respectively at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels.  Bootstrapped P-
values are reported in brackets. 
 